Innovative financing for HIV response in sub-Saharan Africa. by Atun, Rifat et al.
V
IE
W
PO
IN
TS
PA
PE
RS
journal of
health
global
Rifat Atun1, Sachin Silva2, 
Mthuli Ncube3, Anna Vassall4
1  Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Harvard 
University, Boston, USA
2  Health Policy Programme, Imperial College London, 
London, UK
3  Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, 
Oxford, UK
4  London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 
London, UK
Correspondence to:
Professor Rifat Atun, FRCP 
Professor of Global Health Systems 
Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health 
Harvard University 
Boston MA, USA 
ratun@hsph.harvard.edu
Innovative financing for HIV response  
in sub–Saharan Africa 
Background In 2015 around 15 million people living with HIV were 
receiving antiretroviral treatment (ART) in sub–Saharan Africa. Sus-
tained provision of ART, though both prudent and necessary, creates 
substantial long–term fiscal obligations for countries affected by HIV/
AIDS. As donor assistance for health remains constrained, novel fi-
nancing mechanisms are needed to augment funding domestic sourc-
es. We explore how Innovative Financing has been used to co–finance 
domestic HIV/AIDS responses. Based on analysis of non–health sec-
tors, we identify innovative financing instruments that could be used 
in the HIV response.
Methods We undertook a systematic review to identify innovative 
financing instruments used for (1) domestic HIV/AIDS financing in 
sub–Saharan Africa (2) international health financing and (3) financ-
ing in non–health sectors. We analyzed peer–reviewed and grey lit-
erature published between 2002 and 2014. We examined the nature 
and volume of funds mobilized with innovative financing, then in 
consultation with leading experts, identified instruments that held 
potential for financing the HIV response.
Results Our analysis revealed three innovative financing instruments 
in use: Zimbabwe’s AIDS Trust Fund (a tax/levy–based instrument), 
Botswana’s National HIV/AIDS Prevention Support (BNAPS) Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Buy–Down 
(a debt conversion instrument), and Côte d'Ivoire's Debt2Health Debt 
Swap Agreement (a debt conversion instrument). Zimbabwe’s AIDS 
Trust Fund generated US$ 52.7 million between 2008 and 2011, Bo-
tswana’s IBRD Buy–Down generated US$ 20 million, and Côte 
d’Ivoire’s Debt2Health Debt Swap Agreement generated US$ 27 mil-
lion, at least half of which was to be invested in HIV/AIDS programs. 
Four additional categories of innovative financing instruments met 
our criteria for future use: (1) remittances and diaspora bonds (2) so-
cial and development impact bonds (3) sovereign wealth funds (4) 
risk and credit guarantees.
Conclusion A limited number of innovative financing instruments 
contributed a very modest share of funding toward domestic HIV/
AIDS programs. Several innovative financing instruments success-
fully applied in other sectors could be used to augment domestic fi-
nancing toward HIV/AIDS programmes.
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By 2015, around 15 million individuals were accessing life–saving anti-
retroviral treatment (ART) [1]. Yet, the “AIDS transition” [2] is not in 
sight–in 2014, there were 36.9 million people living with HIV, 2 million 
new HIV infections and 1.2 million AIDS–related deaths [3].
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The continuing HIV epidemic requires sustained investment 
to prevent new infections and to provide treatment to those 
who need ART now and in the future. However, as more in-
dividuals access ART, domestic obligations for financing HIV 
will increase, reaching an estimated US$ 190 billion between 
2015 and 2050 and account for as high as 47% of the GDP 
in high prevalence sub–Saharan African countries such as 
Malawi [4], creating long term commitments that have to be 
met. The financial obligations have major implications for 
the affected countries and donors–not just in economic 
terms, but also in the way they manage financing of the HIV 
response, which requires empowering countries to take 
greater responsibility for managing funds from all sources.
The return of investment in HIV response as measured by 
benefit to cost ratio has been estimated at 280% [5], with 
substantial economic, social and health benefits reported 
by other studies [6], comparable to benefit to cost ratios 
reported for maternal and child health investments [7]. 
However, donor financing, which accounts for a large share 
of the HIV/AIDS funding in sub–Saharan Africa, is con-
strained due to the global economic crisis [8]. Domestic 
financing remains equally challenging, especially in high–
prevalence low–income countries that are fiscally con-
strained. Compounding the financing challenges are inef-
ficiencies in channeling and use of available funds, and the 
harmful asymmetry between the long–term financing 
needs for HIV and short–term replenishment cycles of do-
nor institutions [9].
There are opportunities for increasing HIV financing, how-
ever. African economies are enjoying economic growth 
[10]. There are also untapped natural resources that could 
generate upwards of US$ 4 billion each year [11]. Addi-
tional fiscal space could be created in domestic budgets by 
improving efficiency in allocation both to and within HIV 
programmes and by co–financing HIV services with fund-
ing from other economic sectors [12]. Innovative financing 
could offer new sources of funding. Conceived as a fund-
ing source to meet the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), innovative financing, which provided around US$ 
6 billion in total in 2002–2012 [13], is increasingly an im-
portant source of funding for global health [14].
We explore how innovative financing could be used to co–
finance the long–term HIV obligations by augmenting do-
mestic contributions in sub–Saharan Africa. We analyze 
how different innovative financing instruments can be op-
erationalised and the institutional arrangements needed for 
their effective use.
METHODS
We undertook a systematic review to identify domestic in-
novative financing used to augment funding for HIV pro-
grammes in sub–Saharan African countries. We then ex-
tended the search to identify innovative financing used in 
global health and non–health sectors.
We searched peer–reviewed literature and grey literature 
published between 2002 and 2014, the period when in-
novative financing gained prominence following the Unit-
ed Nations International Conference on Financing for De-
velopment [15], and the publication of the High Level 
Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health 
Systems [16]. We also searched web sites of development 
agencies, and international financing institutions for pub-
lished reports and to gather data. We provide the frame-
work for the search, a listing of the data sources and the 
search strings (Figure S1 in Online Supplementary Docu-
ment). In qualifying a financing scheme as innovative, we 
that took into account the nature of the financing, institu-
tional arrangements and the mode of financing (pooling, 
channeling and allocation of funds) [13].
We used predetermined criteria (Figure S2 in Online Sup-
plementary Document) to systematically examine the na-
ture and magnitude of funding that could be mobilised, the 
characteristics of the innovative financing and their suit-
ability for long–term funding of HIV obligations. We 
sought views of leading experts involved in innovative fi-
nancing and development finance (from the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, The African Development 
Fund, the Global to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) and in domes-
tic funding of HIV programmes in sub–Saharan countries 
(such as from Kenya, South Africa, and Ethiopia). We then 
categorised the innovative financing instruments with the 
most potential for raising new funds.
We did not consider funding generated from borrowing, 
funding from health insurance, reprioritisation of existing 
budgets and efficiency gains from improvements in health 
systems [17,18], as these approaches are used routinely in 
funding and managing health budgets.
We analyzed all search results using the Preferred Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta–Analysis (PRISMA) guide-
lines [19]. We present all monetary amounts in 2010 US 
Dollar (US$) equivalents based on World Bank official ex-
change rates [20] and the GDP deflator indices from the 
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis, National Income Product Accounts Tables [21]. We re-
port our findings by calendar year.
RESULTS
Innovative financing from taxes, levies and 
debt conversion instruments
The systematic review revealed three innovative financing 
instruments using national taxes and levies and debt con-
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version for countries including debt buy–down currently 
in use for HIV/AIDS, namely: Zimbabwe’s AIDS Trust Fund 
[22], Botswana’s National HIV/AIDS Prevention Support 
(BNAPS) International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (IBRD) Buy–Down [23], and Côte d'Ivoire's Debt-
2Health Debt Swap Agreement [24].
We briefly mention three other innovative financing instru-
ments which were intended but were not established as 
functioning entities, were established and then terminated, 
or had failed to generate meaningful revenues.
Taxes and levies
Established in 2000, Zimbabwe’s AIDS Trust Fund received 
proceeds from a 3% tax levied on formal sector employers 
and employees. Of the total funds collected, 50% was ear-
marked for ART programmes, 10% for prevention pro-
grammes, and the remainder toward program administra-
tion and support. The funding generated in 2000–2008 
was not available as the estimated figures were distorted 
due to hyperinflation. In 2008–2011, the levy generated 
US$ 52.7 million (89.8% of the US$ 58.7 million in total 
domestic public HIV spending [25]), with US$ 5.7 million 
generated in 2009, US$ 20.5 million in 2010 and US$ 26.5 
million in 2011 [26].
We identified other tax/levy–based instruments, which 
have been proposed, but not fully scaled up or implement-
ed. For example, starting in fiscal year 2015/16, Kenya is 
establishing an HIV investment unit that will develop a 
model for resourcing a new HIV Trust Fund which will be 
created within the National AIDS Control Council, and will 
seek to mobilise resources from domestic and internation-
al sources, including matching funds, corporate social in-
vestments, debt swaps, infrastructure bonds and the infor-
mal sector [27], but the scheme is not yet operational.
The government of Uganda has proposed to establish a HIV 
Trust Fund (based on the Zimbabwe model) to provide 
sustainable financing for HIV programmes. The HIV Pre-
vention and Control Act, 2014 has stipulated the source of 
income for the Fund from levies (2% of the total tax reve-
nues) on beers, spirits, soft drinks and bottled water, in ad-
dition to income from international sources [28].
Tanzania has also established an AIDS Trust Fund in 2015 
through the Tanzania Commission for Aids (Amendment) 
Act 2014 enacted by the Parliament in early 2015 to reduce 
donor dependence [29].
Trust Funds are a new and a promising new approach that 
pools funds revenues from multiple sources [30]. Here the 
innovation is less about the source of financing but more 
about the pooling and application of funds [13].
Tax and levy–based instruments have the potential increase 
in revenues in sub–Saharan Africa, (where trade taxes have 
declined since 1990s and income taxes have stagnated 
since 2000 [31]) and where revenue streams from extrac-
tive industries that could be taxed [11]. Revenues from 
taxes and levies can be earmarked or ring–fenced for HIV 
programs within public finance budget (as with Zimba-
bwe’s AIDS Levy). However, ring–fencing or earmarking 
reduces fungibility of public funds [32] and may limit a 
government’s ability to respond to unexpected shocks and 
to adjust allocations for short–term priorities [33].
Debt conversion
Buy–downs convert credits to grants, often with conditions 
[34]. Debt conversion instruments can be operationalised 
using a combination of schemes. With bilateral conversion, 
where the lender simply cancels all or a portion of the loan 
or credit, operationalisation means ensuring that the con-
ditions for cancellation/forgiveness are met. In most in-
stances, program monitoring is mediated via the respective 
ministries and debt cancellation occurs ex–post [34]. With 
trilateral conversion, if the lender cancels or forgives all or 
part of a loan with the expectation that the debtor invest 
that portion in a multilateral institution, a modified debt 
arrangement maybe required. If on the other hand, a third 
party donor purchases all or part of a loan either condition-
ally or unconditionally, the execution of the debt arrange-
ment must occur ex–ante due to the inclusion of addition-
al institutions [34].
Botswana’s National HIV/AIDS Prevention Support IBRD 
Buy–Down of US$ 50 million was used to address imple-
mentation gaps in the domestic HIV response. The pro-
gram also supported the implementation of a new nation-
al operational plan for scaling up prevention as a national 
“survival strategy”. A buy–down of US$ 20 million, sup-
ported by the European Commission was later introduced 
in Botswana to reduce HIV prevalence in young adults with 
conversion predicated on the HIV program meeting per-
formance objectives [35].
A similar but more recent buy–down under Debt2Health, 
a novel debt conversion instrument managed by the Glob-
al Fund [36], provided US$ 27 million to the domestic HIV 
response in Côte d'Ivoire. In exchange for the creditor 
(Germany) forgoing the US$ 27 million debt, Côte d'Ivoire 
was required to invest at least half of the proceeds on na-
tional HIV treatment and prevention programmes [37]. 
While Debt2Health has financed several HIV/AIDS pro-
grammes worldwide, Côte d'Ivoire is the only African 
country to benefit from the instrument.
Between 2001 and 2011, sub–Saharan Africa received ap-
proximately US$ 2 billion in concessional aid for HIV/AIDS 
programmes [38], which offers potential for the use of 
Debt2Health. Between 2011 and 2013, debt conversion 
programmes totaling US $45.7 million were signed using 
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Debt2Health [39], including US$ 27 million for Côte 
d'Ivoire.
We summarize in Table 1 the key features of the innova-
tive financing instruments discussed.
Airline levy and contributions from retail 
sales
In addition to innovative financing from taxes and levies 
and debt conversion international innovative financing 
such as Airline Solidarity Levy (Airline Levy) [40] and 
PRODUCT(RED)TM [41] have been used to generate fi-
nancing for HIV/AIDS programmes. Airline Solidarity 
Levy is domestically implemented with revenues pooled 
and channeled via UNITAID. In Africa, distinct from the 
Airline Solidarity Levy, several countries have introduced 
their own versions of airline levies, including Cameroon, 
Congo, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius and Niger, and is un-
der consideration in Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African 
Republic, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Namibia, Sen-
egal, São Tomé and Principe, and Togo [40]. Product(RED) 
generates revenue through direct contributions via retail 
sales in Western countries the proceeds of which are then 
channelled to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculo-
sis and Malaria [42].
Innovative financing for other services with 
potential future use for HIV/AIDS
Our analysis of global health and non–health sectors re-
vealed four additional categories of innovative financing 
with the potential to expand fiscal space and provide ad-
ditional funding for HIV/AIDS, namely: remittances and 
diaspora bonds; social and development impact bonds; 
sovereign wealth funds; and guarantees (See Panel in On-
line Supplementary Document for a summary of these 
categories).
Remittances and diaspora bonds
In 2014, remittances accounted for US$ 67.1 billion of the 
US$ 206.6 billion in external flows to sub–Saharan Africa. 
Nigeria was the largest recipient with US$ 21 billion in 
2013 [31]. Remittances are additional and particularly at-
tractive given their stability in comparison to direct foreign 
investment or private financing flows.
Remittances can be mobilised via issuance of diaspora 
bonds, which have been successfully used in India (since 
1991), in Israel (since 1951) and in Sri Lanka (since 2001). 
A diaspora bond can be developed either directly by a gov-
ernment or a state–owned bank. The bond can be setup to 
raise revenues on a continuous basis (annual issuance) or 
on an on–demand basis (opportunistic issuance), and can 
be established as non–negotiable fixed rate or as floating 
rate bonds or notes in different denominations. Fixed rate 
bonds, which are inherently less volatile, provide increased 
predictability to financing [43].
Diaspora bonds offer several benefits to issuers. Due to in-
vestors’ “patriotic motivations”, the issuer could conceivably 
offer a lower rate of return, thereby gaining a “patriotic dis-
count”. The bonds also offer the issuer an opportunity to 
improve sovereign credit rating by creating a new funding 
source. For the investor, aside from meeting personal moti-
vations, the bonds offer the flexibility to receive interest and 
principal in issuer currency, which can be routed to meet li-
abilities in the issuing country [43].
While revenues from India’s diaspora bonds were used to 
offset the country’s balance of payment crisis in 1991 [44], 
Table 1. Innovative financing instruments in use in sub–Saharan Africa, those planned, and their features
Instrument name OperatIOnal status Year establIshed Instrument tYpe sOurce Of revenue fInancIng agent revenues generated/fOrecast
Botswana’s National HIV/
AIDS Prevention Support 
(BNAPS) IBRD Buy–Down
Operational 2009 Debt 
buy–down
Concessional or 
non–concessional 
debt
European Commission 
(up to US$ 20 million)
US$ 50 million  
(over five years)
Côte d'Ivoire's 
Debt2Health Debt Swap 
Agreement
Operational 2010 Debt swap Concessional or 
non–concessional 
debt
Government of 
Germany
US$ 27 million
Zimbabwe’s AIDS Trust 
Fund
Operational 2000 Levy Formal sector 
employee and 
employer income
Domestic government US$ 85.2 million 
(through 2012)
Kenya's National Aids 
Control Council (NACC) 
Tax
Not yet 
operational
Not yet established Multiple 
sources
Multiple sources Domestic government, 
augmented with funds 
from external sources
Unknown
Uganda's HIV Trust Fund Not yet 
operational
Established by HIV 
and AIDS 
Prevention and 
Control Act, 2014
Tax Tax revenue from 
alcohol, soft 
drinks and 
bottled water
Domestic government 
and international 
sources
Unknown
Tanzania's AIDS Trust 
Fund
Not yet 
operational
Established in 2015 Not 
specified
Not specified Domestic government Unknown
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the Israeli diaspora bonds have financed public works such 
as seawater desalination, housing construction and commu-
nication infrastructure [43]. Though we did not uncover 
evidence of the use in health programs, the characteristics of 
these instruments suggest that it could be a viable source.
Social Impact Bonds and Development 
Impact Bonds
Impact bonds have gained prominence as a means to at-
tract and “crowd in” additional private capital to address 
social challenges. Social Impact Bonds and Development 
Impact Bonds allow private investors to invest in social 
causes and generate suitable financial returns, contingent 
on the quality of the outcomes achieved [45]. In a Social 
Impact Bond the outcome payer is the government, while 
in a Development Impact Bond the outcome payer is a do-
nor, development agency or a philanthropic foundation 
[42]. In incentivising payment based on the quality of the 
outcomes achieved, the Development Impact Bonds offer 
the potential to maximise impact underpinned by rigorous 
monitoring and evaluation. For the sponsoring govern-
ment or agency (the bond issuer), Development Impact 
Bonds offer risk protection and potential overall cost sav-
ings in implementing programmes.
When implementing a social or a development impact 
bond however, governments typically focus on social pro-
grammes with proven interventions, which fall within in-
vestor risk thresholds, can generate cost savings, have well–
defined target populations and have quantifiable impacts/
outcomes. Thus in the health sector, social or development 
impact bonds are most appropriate for preventative rather 
than treatment interventions, as the cost of the latter should 
be met from operational budgets, and borrowing through 
bonds should be used to invest and not fund operational 
expenditures. The ethics of targeting interventions with 
easy to measure outcomes rather than those with the po-
tential to meet most need is debatable, however.
While social impact bonds have proven successful in non–
health sectors, including recidivism reduction in the Unit-
ed Kingdom [46], education and housing in the United 
States [47], they are yet to be implemented in for HIV pre-
vention and control. Several case studies indicate the po-
tential for the health sector however, including in imple-
menting Treatment as Prevention programmes and 
tuberculosis control programmes in Swaziland [48] and 
malaria control programmes in Mozambique [49].
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are special purpose invest-
ment funds owned by governments, which are established 
for creating stable returns on the funds invested for mac-
roeconomic stability, to meet contingent liabilities, and to 
withstand economic shocks [50]. In 2012, total assets of 
SWFs accounted for approximately US$ 3 trillion. Based 
on IMF and the Santiago Principles taxonomy [51], four 
types of SWFs are distinguishable, namely: stabilization 
funds, savings funds, development funds (reserve invest-
ment fund) and pension reserve funds. Stabilization funds 
absorb macroeconomic shocks due to commodity price 
volatility and other external events (eg, Chile’s Economic 
and Social Stabilization Fund). Savings funds preserve 
wealth for future generations by transforming nonrenew-
able resources into monetary assets (eg, the Abu Dhabi In-
vestment Authority). Development funds aim to finance 
social development and infrastructure (eg, Mubadala in 
United Arab Emirates) [52], whereas pension reserve funds 
aim to fund pension–related contingent–type liabilities (eg, 
Norway’s Government Pension Fund).
African Sovereign Wealth Funds accounted for US$ 114.3 
billion in 2009, approximately 3% of global sovereign 
wealth funds at the time. By 2012 there were 15 Sovereign 
Wealth Funds in Africa with the four largest sourced from 
oil and gas revenues and the fifth sourced from diamonds, 
minerals and other natural resources, but amounts used as 
development funds are unknown, due to scarcity of pub-
licly available data [53].
Guarantees
Guarantees can be used to catalyze private financing by 
mitigating risks, especially those that are political, contrac-
tual or regulatory in nature. The largest volume of guaran-
tees originated from the World Bank Group, which pro-
vided by 2013 US$ 4.5 billion as 37 guarantees across 30 
countries [54]. The guarantees were sourced from Interna-
tional Development Association (IDA), IBRD, Internation-
al Finance Corporation (IFC) [55] or the Multilateral In-
vestment and Guarantee Agency (MIGA) [56], and 
structured as Partial Risk Guarantees, Partial Credit Guar-
antees or Policy Based Guarantees.
Partial Risk Guarantees support private sector investment 
including in public–private partnerships. Partial Credit 
Guarantees support commercial borrowing in support of 
public investment projects and Policy Based Guarantees 
support commercial borrowing for budget financing or re-
form programmes. Partial Risk Guarantees are available to 
all IBRD and IDA countries, while Partial Credit Guaran-
tees and Policy Based Guarantees are only available to 
IBRD–eligible countries [54]. Aside from the World Bank 
and other multilateral development banks, private founda-
tions such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation also 
provide guarantees [57].
Guarantees offer several benefits to borrowers. The reduc-
tion of default risk improves potential of the country for se-
curing loans and thereby stimulates additional investment. 
www.jogh.org •  doi: 10.7189/jogh.06.010407	 5	 June 2016  •  Vol. 6 No. 1 •  010407
V
IE
W
PO
IN
TS
PA
PE
RS
Atun et al.
Guarantees can also reduce the cost of capital due to lower 
interest rates afforded to the borrowing government via guar-
antor’s credit worthiness (especially in the case of the World 
Bank due to the bank’s AAA rating) [54]. Guarantees allow 
governments to share the risk of projects with the private 
sector. In the case of World Bank guarantees, capacity build-
ing is also afforded as an added benefit [58]. While guaran-
tees are beneficial to borrowers they create risks to guaran-
teeing entities, which with the prevailing global economic 
crisis may limit the potential for expanding guarantees.
Between 2005 and 2012, the IBRD mobilised US$ 1.2 bil-
lion and IDA mobilised US$ 789 million as guarantees. The 
energy sector received the highest volume of financing (US$ 
2 billion) with IFC or MIGA guarantees, with the largest pro-
portion within the African region (US$ 1.1 billion). The 
health sector however, has yet to receive guarantees from the 
World Bank Group [54]. By contrast, the Gates Foundation 
has issued credit enhancement guarantees to enhance afford-
ability of vaccines and health commodities amounting to 
around US$ 250 000, US$ 500 000 and US$ 400 000 in 
gross exposure in 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively [56].
Borrowing increases future financial liabilities for countries, 
but by reducing the cost of borrowing, guarantees can sig-
nificantly reduce the cost of servicing the debt burden. The 
benefits of guarantees can be further augmented if coun-
tries demonstrate economic returns from HIV treatment/
prevention programmes via reduced HIV incidence and 
enhanced labour productivity that benefit the economy.
DISCUSSION
We identified limited use of innovative financing instru-
ments in domestic financing of HIV programmes in sub–
Saharan Africa. The findings suggest both an opportunity 
to augment domestic financing, but also a possible hin-
drance of innovative financing due to weak domestic po-
litical or regulatory climates – only three innovative financ-
ing instruments were in current use and operationalised to 
generate meaningful revenues.
The instruments that were successfully implemented were 
either based on debt conversion or taxes and levies, how-
ever with no new instruments that unlocked resources to 
generate additional predictable revenues from new sources 
beyond taxes/levies and debt. Innovative financing includ-
ed both new financing instruments, but also innovative 
ways of using existing instruments for HIV–for example 
debt conversion and levies.
The revenues generated through tax/levy mechanisms (US$ 
52.7 million in Zimbabwe), accounted for a relatively minor 
share of the domestic HIV budget [26]. The revenues gener-
ated from debt conversion were also modest (US$ 50 million 
in Botswana [23] and US$ 27 million in Côte d'Ivoire [24]). 
Similarly, despite the growth of bond issuance by countries 
of sub–Saharan Africa [10], there are no bond–based instru-
ments for HIV, even though bonds have been used to finance 
malaria programmes in Mozambique [59].
While the relative absence of innovative financing instru-
ments that generate new sources is a challenge, the nascent 
space for innovative innovative financing is also an oppor-
tunity as countries affected by HIV move to increase do-
mestic share of the financing obligations for HIV. The Glob-
al Fund’s country graduation and counterpart financing 
[60] and PEPFAR’s multi–year partnership framework 
agreements [61] will encourage this transition. Recent evi-
dence suggests that 12 high prevalence sub–Saharan Afri-
can countries would be able to finance as much as 64% of 
future financing needs in 2014–2018 through economic 
growth [9]. Much of the additional financing in these coun-
tries would be from the expansion of domestic fiscal space 
from traditional sources [40], which could be further aug-
mented by innovative financing, if constraints for introduc-
ing new funding instruments are overcome. In this context, 
innovative financing instruments that enable securitisation 
of future income streams offer the most immediate possi-
bility of augmenting existing funding to accelerate the HIV 
response, though the risk of exaggerating already high fu-
ture debt obligations has to be carefully considered. Secu-
ritisation is an area where guarantees could be leveraged, 
as guarantees enable the borrowing countries to substan-
tially reduce the interest payable on the debt while reduc-
ing default risk to lenders–thereby unlocking new funds 
from private sector investors by making the benefit–risk 
calculus more attractive.
Taxes and levies continue to be promising sources of new 
revenue if implemented as a modest charge on high volume 
transactions (especially on goods such as tobacco and alco-
hol with well–proven health harm) to expand the govern-
ment revenue base with revenues pooled and effectively 
committed. Diaspora bonds are hitherto untapped sources 
of funding for the HIV response, due to their long–term na-
ture, which is aligned with the long–term obligations for HIV. 
However, apart from the diaspora bonds issued in India and 
Israel, their widespread uptake is limited [43].
Sovereign wealth funds offer potential new funding sourc-
es if they could be used to leverage private sector invest-
ments, through public–private partnerships to invest in 
health system infrastructure or in new ventures to create 
additional capacity for health service provision in the 
health system, where new providers could be contracted 
by the government to provide services.
Social impact bonds offer significant potential for mobiliz-
ing new and additional external resources from private 
sources. Social impact bonds would be particularly suitable 
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for financing preventative interventions that reduce future 
burden of disease, especially for effective interventions that 
are under–utilized or inefficiently delivered (such as pre-
vention of mother to child transmission, harm reduction, 
voluntary male circumcision, condom distribution and 
use) to bring health, economic and social benefits and 
achieve returns beyond the costs. By transferring the risk of 
success to private investors that bring new funds and inno-
vative service delivery models to the sector, the government 
(or the public sector funding entity) pays for successful out-
comes. The investors, be it philanthropic foundations, high 
net worth individuals or socially conscious funders, receive 
financial return and social benefits.
To maximise the benefits of revenues generated from do-
mestic innovative financing, the “partnership” arrange-
ments between donors and HIV–affected countries must 
be reframed. In spite of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effec-
tiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action [62], country 
ownership of donor funding and health programmes has 
yet to be achieved in most settings. Instead, the partnership 
remains disproportionately weighted toward donors, espe-
cially in countries where donor financing outweighs do-
mestic finding. For example, in Uganda domestic financing 
for HIV accounted for US$ 53 million in 2013, whereas 
donor financing accounted for US$ 446 million [9]. In Ma-
lawi, the donor share of HIV funding was 98% of cumula-
tive spend [63], although the appropriate balance of do-
mestic and international financing is debated [64].
In restructuring the partnership, domestic governments’ 
view that a duty lies with the donor must be balanced with 
a view that emphasizes mutual responsibility and account-
ability to ensure sustainable and predictable financing for 
HIV response. In low income countries with high prevalence 
of HIV, as HIV financing accounts for a large portion of the 
health budget and the GDP [9], however, long term financ-
ing consideration need to rest with the ministry of finance 
and the government in general, which have the responsibil-
ity for management of debt levels and priorities in the avail-
able fiscal space. Similarly, donor perceptions that shifting 
resources among recipient countries is acceptable, as long as 
outlay commitments are met, should also be overcome.
“Commitment Technologies”, which can be utilized to en-
force binding and credible commitments, both from donors 
and recipients, can capitalise on several key features of the 
status quo arrangements. Presently, donors reap the most 
benefit from efficiency gains in development assistance. Re-
cipients on the other hand, are uncertain of benefits, as the 
returns are intangible in budgetary terms, although health 
benefits are real. If donors (or investors) make multi–year 
commitments to invest in a proportion of need, they stand 
to reap a share of efficiency improvements equal to partici-
pation. Similarly, if the incentives for domestic governments 
can be made more tangible, via the use of mechanisms such 
as social impact bonds46, results–based financing [65] or 
cash–on–delivery [66] for example, where results to be de-
livered equate to reduction in incidence, then the prospects 
for reframing the partnership become promising.
The opportunity for innovative financing to augment do-
mestic financing for HIV/AIDS is real and important given 
the magnitude of the long–term obligations in sub–Saha-
ran Africa estimated at around US$ 180 billion [4]. Sus-
taining HIV response in the era of sustainable development 
with competing priorities makes the search for funding 
from innovative financing all the more pressing.
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